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1Abstract
This paper investigates how firms’ bidding behavior in various auctions is affected by
capital structure.  A theoretical model is developed where the first price sealed bid and
the English auction are examined.  We find as debt levels increase, firms tend to
decrease their bids.  The lower bids give the competition incentives to decrease their
bid as well.  These results are then investigated empirically using the recent FCC
spectrum auctions.  Consistent with the theoretical model, larger debt levels of the
bidding firm and the competition tend to lead to lower bids.  Additional determinants of
bidding behavior in these auctions are also analyzed.
2The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and
Evidence form the FCC Auctions
A growing body of literature has been examining the interactions of production
and financial decisions.  There have been two theoretical approaches to the issue.  One
approach seeks to find the link between production and financial decisions in taxes and
in bankruptcy states.  Papers written by Hite (1978), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980),
Dotan and Ravid (1985) and Dammon and Senbet (1988) demonstrate that investment
and financing decisions jointly determine the expected tax liability and the expected
bankruptcy cost paid by firms.
The alternative approach is to view leverage as a strategic variable, affecting firm
production choices. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), and later Brander
and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988), Titman (1984) Clayton (1999) and others
suggest that debt can affect the quantity produced in oligopoly settings and that it can
also impact decisions such as entry and investments.  More recently, Showalter (1995)
and Dasgupta and Titman (1998) have examined how debt affects price setting in
oligopoly models.  While the strategic approach seems to be supported by some recent
empirical evidence (see Chevalier (1995a, 1995b) and Phillips (1995)), there may be
other explanations for these empirical findings (see Ravid (1999))1. 
The impact of debt on the firm’s real decisions should be most pronounced for
short-term behavior, where debt restructuring is less likely.  Our paper discusses a
particular type of short run production interaction, namely the bidding behavior of firms
in auctions.  We first demonstrate that under some reasonable assumptions, levered
firms will tend to under-bid (bid a lower price) compared to unlevered firms.  These
results are robust to some common auction designs, which broadly resemble the recent
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions.  We investigate these
auctions empirically, and find that the behavior predicted by the theory is consistent with
firm bidding strategies in these auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 discusses auction theory
and leverage.  The equilibrium-bidding behavior in the first price sealed bid auction is
determined.  In addition, the upper bound on the equilibrium bid in the English auction
is determined.  Section 2 presents the data and provides the empirical results from the
FCC spectrum auction.  Section 3 concludes.
                                                
1 On a more basic level, Maksimovic and Kim (1990) document the impact of leverage on the production
function in the airline industry.  They demonstrate that debt causes inefficiencies, which is consistent with
some agency models of conflicts between debt holders and shareholders.
31 Auction Theory
Auction design is very important in determining optimal strategies by bidders and
sellers and revenue to sellers.  In general, different types of auctions may yield different
strategies and different revenues to sellers.  This complicates the application of any
analysis to real life auctions, which usually do not conform precisely to any theoretical
model.  Thus a major focus of the literature has been to compare various auction
structures in terms of strategies and revenues to the seller.  Vickrey (1961), under
simplifying assumptions, shows that the open “English” and the first price sealed bid
auctions provide equal expected revenue to the seller.  Two important assumption in
Vickery’s (1961) work are that each bidder’s valuation is an independent draw from an
identical uniform distribution, and that all players are risk neutral.  Myerson (1981) and
Riley and Samuelson (1981) expand on Vickrey’s results and demonstrate that, under
less restrictive assumptions, several other auctions generate equivalent expected
revenue to the seller.  Thus, the revenue equivalence theorem asserts that the open
“English”, first price sealed bid, second price sealed bid, and descending Dutch
auctions yield the same expected revenue to the seller.  The assumption of risk
neutrality is maintained.  The bidders’ valuations must be independent draws from an
identical distribution; however, this distribution need not be uniform.  This implies that
when a seller wishes to allocate a good through an auction, the expected payment is
the same under various auction mechanisms.
Various authors provide frameworks that relax the assumptions of the revenue
equivalence theorem, which seems to indicate that under realistic settings auction
design may still matter.  Holt (1980), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Maskin and Riley
(1984) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that under various assumptions, revenue
equivalence fails to hold.  When risky debt is outstanding, revenue equivalence may
thus fail, and thus we need to examine several auction structures which resemble the
complex FCC auction design. 
The FCC used an innovative auction form called a simultaneous ascending
auction.  The basic procedure involves putting several items up for auction
simultaneously through a repeated sealed bid structure.  In each round, participants
submit sealed bids on one or more of the items.  As long as one item receives a new
high bid, the auction proceeds to the next round.  When no new high bids are
submitted, the auction ends and the items are each sold to the highest bidder at a price
equal to the amount they bid.  To this already complex auction form, the FCC added a
multitude of complex rules from dynamic eligibility requirements, the ability to withdraw
bids, and the possibility of a reserve price.  Regarding the complexity of the auctions:
McMillan, Rothschild, and Wilson (1997) [p. 429] say “The setting for the FCC auctions
is far more complicated than any model yet, or ever likely to be, written down.”  Further
more McAfee and McMillan (1996)  [p. 171 - 172] state:
4The spectrum sale is more complicated than anything in auction theory.  No theorem
exists – or can be expected to develop – that specifies the optimal auction form.
A lesson from this experience of theorists in policymaking is that the real value of the
theory is in developing intuition.  The role of theory, in any policy application, is to show
how people behave in various circumstances, and to identify the tradeoffs involved in
altering those circumstances.  What theorists found to be the most useful in designing the
auction and advising the bidders was not complicated models that try to capture a lot of
reality at the cost of relying on special functional forms.  Such theorizing fails to develop
intuition, as it confounds the effects of functional forms with the essential elements of the
model.  Instead, a focused model that isolates a particular effect and assumes few or no
special functional forms is more helpful in building understanding.
Clearly we can not attempt to model the auction in every detail.  Instead we look at
some basic auction models that resemble the FCC auctions, and discuss how leverage
would affect bidding in these models.  The simultaneous ascending auction the FCC
used has elements of a first price sealed bid auction as well as elements of an English
auction.  The firms were required to submit sealed bids and upon completion of the
auction, the firm with the highest bid won, and paid their bid.  This is similar to a first
price sealed bid auction.  However, the bidding was completed in rounds.  After every
round the bids were announced and everyone was allowed to submit new bids.  This is
similar to an English auction.  Thus, we proceed by examining how debt affects bids in
both the standard first price sealed bid setting and the standard English auction setting.
We proceed by first laying out the basic assumptions about the bidders and the
general setting that are maintained throughout the theory section on the paper.  We
then analyze the first price sealed bid auction, and conclude the theory by investigating
the English auction.  The subsequent sections contain empirical analysis of the FCC
auctions and conclusions.
1.1 The General Setting
 For simplicity, we assume one seller, and n bidding firms.  The value of the
object sold may be different for each bidder, but each bidder knows their own valuation.
This is the private values assumption, which is one of two standard auction settings. 
The alternative assumption is common value.  Under the common value framework, the
value of the object is assumed to be the same to all bidders but it is unknown.  Each
bidder receives only a signal about the true value of the object.  The common value
model is typically used to account for uncertainty about the true value of the object. 
According to several sources, common value elements were less important for the FCC
auctions (see later discussion) therefore, we omitted the discussion of such auctions
from the text (we do discuss how uncertainty may affect the bidding strategy in the
English auction section below).  We also assume that all players are risk neutral, and
firms bid to maximize their equity value.
5The value to firm i (i =1, . . . , n) of acquiring the good, vi, is distributed with a
known probability distribution Fi.  The value realization of each firm is assumed to be an
independent draw from the above distribution.  Prior to the bidding stage, each firm
observes their own value, however, only the distributions of the competing firms’ values
are known.  Firm i has debt outstanding with face value FVi, which must be paid prior to
shareholders receiving any payoff.   The debt level of each firm is common knowledge.
Each firm is assumed to have cash on hand, ci.  If a firm cannot pay debtholders in full
then the shareholders’ payoff is zero.
It is assumed throughout the paper that the debt of each firm is risky.  To keep
the exposition of the model as simple as possible, this risk is created through the
assumption that FVi > ci.  This means the if a firm does not win the auction it will
default.  The magnitude of the debt overhang is what affects the firms bidding.  Thus,
we define the debt overhang of firm i as Di = FVi – ci, and we refer to this as the firms
debt though out the theory section of the paper.
 Alternatively we could assume that the firm’s underlying assets have a random
value, and with some positive probability the total value of the firm’s assets will be less
than the amount of debt outstanding.  This assumption would lead to the same basic
result (more risky debt leads to lower bids), however, the effects would be somewhat
mitigated.  The intuition is as follows: if the firm knows it will not be bankrupt it will bid as
if Di is zero.  However, if the firm knows it will be bankrupt it would bid as below (less for
larger Di).  If there is a probability distribution over possible Di, so that the firm may or
may not be bankrupt the optimal bid would take into account both possibilities and thus
would be between the two bids and thus at least weakly decreasing in Di.  It is important
to point out that this assumes the firm knows the value of the object, vi, with certainty. 
For a discussion of random object value see section 1.4.  Qualitatively this more
complicated model does not alter the basic insight; i.e. that firms that bid to maximize
equity value only consider profits conditional on being solvent.  Thus, we proceed under
the assumption that a firm which loses the auction will default.
In each auction firms compete though a bidding procedure.  The strategy of firm i will
be a bid, bi (.), which is a function of the firm's own value, vi, the firm’s own debt Di, the
competing firms’ debt Dj (j≠i), and what the firm believes to be the distribution of the
competing firms’ values, Fj(vj) (j≠i).  The firm that wins the auction receives the good for a
payment, p, determined by the auction mechanism.  Throughout this paper it is assumed
that firm i wins the auction and that the value of the object along with the cash on hand are
sufficient to make the payment, p, i.e. p < vi + ci.  In essence, this means that a firm will not
default on the payment for the good.  However, a firm can finance some of the payment if p
< c.2 Firm i thus receives profits of vi - p, and all other firms receive zero profits from the
auction.  Firm i must pay off its debt, Di, and its shareholders receive any residual profits. 
                                                
2 For example, if V = 100, p = 60 and c = 50, the firm can borrow the extra 10 to pay for the object.
6Firm i's shareholders receive max{vi-p-Di, 0}.  Since Dj>0 the shareholders of firm j (j≠i)
receive nothing.
We now determine the Nash equilibrium bidding strategies and try to assess the role
of leverage in the process.  Each firm’s bid function is a best response to the competing
firms’ strategies.  Thus, given the competing firms’ bid functions, each firm chooses its bid
to maximize the expected payoff to its shareholders.  In equilibrium, no firm has an incentive
to change its strategy.  Let πi[bi(vi,Di,Dj), bj(vj,Dj,Di)] denote the expected payoff realized by
the shareholders of firm i as a functions of the bidding strategies.  The bid functions b (.)i
∧
 ( i
= 1,…,n) are equilibrium bid functions if for each firm i:
for all possible bi(.).  Note that b-i(.) in the above equation represents the bidding strategies
of all firms except firm i.
1.2 First Price Sealed Bid Auction
As noted, the FCC auctions have elements of a first price sealed bid auction and an English
auction.  We will begin the analysis with the former mechanism, where it is also easiest to
see the impact of debt. In a first price sealed bid auction, the firms submit their bids to the
buyer simultaneously.  The firm that submits the highest bid wins the auction and pays a
price equal to their bid.  If multiple firms submit equal bids, the winner is determined
randomly with each of the high bidding firms having an equal chance of winning.  The firm
receives the value vi, and is left with max {vi - bi - Di, 0} to distribute to its shareholders.  All
other firms lose the auction and receive no additional profits.  A strategy for firm i is a bid
function bi(.) based on its own realized value, vi, the debt levels of all the firms, Di, and its
prior belief of the distribution of the competing firms’ values and bid functions.  A Nash
equilibrium is a bid function for each bidder, where each firm is maximizing the expected
payoff to shareholders given the bid functions of the competing firms.  The bid functions
b (.)i
∧
are equilibrium bid functions if for all i
The intuition of this expression is straightforward - a bid function is optimal if the expected
payoff from winning is maximized.
A firm will not want to bid above its valuation because if it does and wins it will make
negative profits.  In addition, if a firm bids above its valuation in a first price auction the
shareholders are guaranteed a zero payoff.  Moreover, if the firm submits a bid greater than
or equal to its valuation of the good minus its debt (bi≥vi-Di), then if the firm wins the auction
π πi i i i i ib b b b[ (.), (.)] [ (.), (.)]
∧ ∧
−
∧
−
≥
b v b c D b bi
b
i i i i i i∈ − + − > −arg max[max( , )]Pr{ (.)}0
7there will be no residual profit left for shareholders.  In fact if bi>vi-Di, then upon winning the
auction, the firm won't have enough money to completely pay off the outstanding debt.  For
this reason, a firm that chooses a bid to maximize the expected payoff to shareholders will
bid bi<vi-Di.  As the firm decreases its bid from bi=vi-Di+ci, the probability winning the auction
decreases, but the payoff shareholders receive conditional on the firm winning increases. 
The firm will decrease its bid below vi-Di trading off these two effects until the expected
payoff to shareholders is maximized given its value realization and the competitors’ bidding
strategies.  We will now proceed to analyze the optimal strategies of the bidding firms.
For each firm define a random variable wi = vi – Di, and the following relation:
Relation 1:
The above statement indicates that any bid, which maximizes the shareholder’s
expected payoff if the firm wins and the shareholders do not have limited liability, also
maximizes the shareholder’s expected payoff under limited liability.3 If we assume the
values, wi, are independent draws from an identical distribution then the following bids
represent an equilibrium (see McAfee and McMillan 1987):
where F is the cumulative distribution function of w.  This will be true for symmetric bidders,
i.e. if we assume that all values are independent draws from the same distribution, and all
firms have the same amount of debt, i.e., for all i, Di = D.  From Relation 1 and equation 1,
the following bids represent an equilibrium:
where F is the cumulative distribution function of v. 
Proposition 1.  The Nash equilibrium bids, bi, are  decreasing in D.
PROOF:  Follows immediately from the first derivative of equation (2).
                                                
3 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this result.  This relation allows us to simplify the
exposition of the symmetric private value case.
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8Proposition 2.  The expected high bid, and thus the expected payment to the seller,
are decreasing in D.
PROOF:  Result follows from proposition 1
Proposition 3.  Each firms’ expected profits increase in D.
PROOF:  Result follows from proposition 1
As we noted earlier, risky debt affects the bidding strategies of the firms in several
ways.  As the amount of debt, D, increases, the bidding functions of the firms decline.
This decreases the expected revenue to the seller.  This also increases the expected profits
and the total value of the bidding firms.  Assuming that debtholders pay a fair market value
for the debt issued, any increase in profits accrues to shareholders.  
In this section we have demonstrated that leverage induces firms to bid less
aggressively in a first price sealed bid private value auction, i.e. they bid lower than
unlevered firms, thereby transferring value from the seller to the shareholders of the bidding
firms.
1.3 English Auction
In this section, we investigate the effect of debt on bidding behavior in an English
auction setting.  In the standard English auction, bidders are continuously allowed to
submit higher bids for an item.  Bidding remains open until no bidder is willing to submit
a higher bid.  The high bid wins, and pays their bid for the item.  This framework is
perhaps the closest abstract setting to the complex FCC auctions.  We maintain all the
assumptions about the players from above.  The classic solution in such a setting,
when capital structure is not considered, is that each bidder will continue to increase
their bid by the minimum increment until bidding reaches their valuation.  I.e., Each
bidder i sets b*i = vi, where b*i is the maximum bid player i is willing to submit.
We now examine how the existing leverage of a firm affects its behavior in the
English auction.  Our first observation is that the firm will clearly be willing to bid up to
the point at which vi – bi = Di.  I.e. bi = vi – Di.  Another way to see this is that if the firm
wins the auction with a bid of bi, then the profits from the auction are vi – bi.  If bi is such
that vi – bi > Di, the profits are sufficient to pay off the debt holders and the equity
holders receive vi – bi - Di.  If the firm loses the auction, the equity holders receive a
zero payoff.  Thus, it is always beneficial for the firm to choose a stopping rule b*i ≥ vi –
Di.
9Proposition 4.  A stopping rule b*i∈ {vi - Di , ∞ ]  for all participants, constitutes a Nash
equilibrium in the English auction.
It is shown above why vi – Di is the minimum stopping point a firm would choose.  Note
that equity receives a payoff of zero if the firm bids above vi – Di, and wins the auction. 
Equity also receives a payoff of zero the firm loses the auction, so the firm is indifferent
between any stopping rule b*i ≥ vi – Di. 
Proposition 5.  The lower bound of the set of sustainable Nash equilibrium bids is
decreasing in leverage.
This follows immediately from examining the equilibrium bid interval in proposition 4.  If
a firm has larger debt, Di, then the minimum equilibrium stopping point is at a lower bid,
vi – Di.
Discussion
We have shown that in a simple, abstract setting, bidding will be lower for both
English and first price sealed bid auctions.  We now consider several complicating
factors.  The most notable is the cost to submit bids.  If bidding is costly, bidders will
have incentives to end the auction quickly in order to minimize the total costs of bidding.
Daniel and Hirshleifer (1996) show that bidding costs can lead to jump bids to signal
valuations, and decrease the number of steps in an English auction.  In the absence of
a signaling motive, the addition of bidding cost would only slightly affect the set of Nash
equilibrium stopping bids determined in Proposition 4.  The minimum possible
equilibrium bid would now be vi – Di minus the cost to submit a bid.  With signaling, this
would still be the minimum possible equilibrium bid, however, the firm would also take
into account the signals received of other players valuations before deciding to submit
another bid (even if the current bid level was below vi – Di – {the cost to submit a bid}). 
We have also assumed so far that the manger can submit bids with no personal
cost, such as a cost of effort. If the bidding cost include a direct cost to the manager,
then no bids above vi – Di – {the cost to submit a bid} will ever be submitted, since the
bidder incurs a cost and all benefits go to bondholders.  To fully model the effects of an
effort cost to management we would have to explicitly model the benefits management
receives from winning the auction.  The benefit is likely to come through either 1)
promotion and increased salary based on the profitability of wining the auction for the
firm (i.e. based on vi – Di, or 2) from an increase in value of stock or stock options that
management has in the firm.  The minimum bid that management would want to bid up
to would be approximately vi - Di.  The actual minimum stopping bid would be slightly
lower and it would be based on the manager’s cost to submit the bid relative to the
benefit the manager receives when vi - Di > 0.  In addition, and more importantly,
submitting a bid above vi - Di can no longer be an equilibrium strategy.  For any bid
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above vi - Di management knows they will get no benefit if the firm wins but they pay a
personal cost to submit the bid. Thus we have the following:
Proposition 6
If managers incur a personal cost in bidding, the highest bid they will be willing to
submit will decline with leverage.
1.4 Uncertain Object Value
There are two classical effects of leverage on firm behavior, dating back to
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977).  The first is under-investment, in other
words, shareholders do not care about states in which revenues only accrue to bond-
holders.  Thus if they must pay for the investment and they only receive a payoff if the
firm is solvent they may turn down a project that has a positive NPV.  The second effect
is risk shifting, i.e. shareholders will tend to select riskier projects, since they reap a
disproportional share of the benefits if the project succeeds, whereas bondholders bear
most the costs if the project fails.  When a firm decreases its bid it is under investing,
and at the same time increasing the risk of the auction.  The risk is increased, since
with a lower bid the firm has a smaller probability of wining the auction, but if it wins it
will realize a higher payoff.  This assumes that the auction is a private value auction, i.e.
the firm knows what value it places on the object.
If we assume that the true value of the object is unknown to the bidder, then
there are two possible ways the bidder can increase the risk of the auction.  The first
would be to lower the bid as above. The second would be to raise the bid, thus
increasing the probability of winning.  At the same time, this exposes the firm to the risk
of the underlying object’s value.  In such a case, higher bidding may create increased
risk.  Thus, our predictions are most applicable in settings where the main source of
uncertainty is whether a bidder wins at a given price, rather than how much the object is
worth (after conditioning on all the information available to bidders).  It is extremely
difficult to model the latter uncertainty in the private value case.  In fact, we know of no
such model.  Uncertainty of object value is typically modeled in a common value
framework.  The consultants who designed the FCC auctions suggested that common
value and affiliated value effects were not important in those auctions (we thank a
referee for bring this to our attention, see Salant (1997)).  However, if object value
uncertainty exists, then leverage may lead to either higher or lower bids – the issue
becomes an empirical question.
A second point is more general.  Risk shifting is often made difficult by various
bond covenants, especially for riskier companies (some of the firms in our sample were
rated BBB and below).  On the other hand, under-investment essentially cannot be
stopped.  There are no covenants that force companies to invest.  Therefore it seems
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that it will be much easier to respond to under-investment incentives rather than to risk
shifting incentives.  Further, since in real life investment opportunities are usually not
known at the time the debt is issued, pricing them out would be impossible.  For these
two reasons, one would expect the theoretical analysis above to be most applicable to
the FCC auctions.  However, again, what actually happens is an empirical issue.
2 Evidence from FCC spectrum auctions
It is common for interaction papers (see for example, Brander and Lewis (1986),
Dotan and Ravid (1985), Dammon and Senbet (1988) Maksimovic (1988) or Clayton
(1999)) to model a single firm or a small number of competitors (typically two), where
each “firm” is essentially comprised of a single project.  However, empirical testing of
these models is generally in a more complex setting.  Maksimovic and Kim (1990),
Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Phillips (1995) and others all use data from industries with a
large number of competitors and a large number of projects.4  Also, the effects we
model are just one component of the numerous factors that determine firms’ actions
and reactions.  However, the fact that the effects analyzed in our model are robust to
different basic types of auctions gives us some confidence as to the applicability of the
results.  In order to test our conjectures empirically, we needed to find auctions with
detailed information regarding bids and where competitors are publicly traded firms so
that leverage can be estimated.  We therefore chose the recent FCC auctions. 5
 
We shall now briefly describe the FCC auctions analyzed in this section.6  A
more detailed description is provided in Appendix B.  With the expansion of
communications and the broadcast media in recent years, the government has begun
auctioning off the airwaves.  These airwaves had previously been given away,
essentially free of charge, to radio and TV stations, telephone companies and others,
complying with certain regulatory restrictions.  There have been several spectrum
auctions in recent years, employing reasonably complex rules.
The auction we are investigating offered for sale the important "Broadband"
spectrum.  Two blocks (A and B) of 30 MHz each, in 51 Metropolitan areas were open
for bids (except for New York, Los Angeles, and Washington D.C. where only block B
was auctioned).  This produced a total of 99 blocks.  In total these blocks cover the
entire continental United States.  Each geographical area had two incumbents, winners
of previous auctions, each holding title to a 25 MHz band.  A and B licenses thus
                                                
4 See Porter (1995) for an example of empirical auction literature.
5 An auction with costly bidding, such as in Daniel and Hirshleifer (1996), would result in bids closer to the
empirical bids observed in the FCC auctions.  However, Daniel and Hirshleifer’s (1996) model is still a
simplified version of a more complex reality. If we were to extend their model to our setting, the theoretical
analysis would have been considerably more cumbersome.
6 For a detailed analysis and assessment of these auctions see Cramton (1997)
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allowed a third and a fourth competitor to enter, each receiving title to a 30 MHz band. 
This spectrum was intended for “personal communication”, which has a broad legal
meaning, but is well suited for digital cellular communication, including fax and data
transmission.  The auction began on December 5, 1994 and ended on March 13, 1995
after 112 rounds.  It raised 7.7 billion dollars for the government.
The auction proceeded in rounds as follows: in round 1, each firm submitted a
sealed bid on any block (or blocks) they chose.  These bids were then revealed and the
high bid for each block was determined.  The auction now proceeded to Round 2,
where each firm could again submit a sealed bid for any block (or blocks) they wished. 
The bids were announced, and it was determined if any blocks had new high bids.  If at
least one block had a new high bid, then the auction continued to Round 3 where again
firms could submit sealed bids for any block (or blocks).7  The auction continued until a
round occurred where no block received an increased bid.  This mechanism was
established because it was believed that there would be synergies between the blocks,
which is consistent with our empirical results.  The winning bidders essentially had to
pay the amount they bid in cash (more specifically, there was an upfront payment which
defined eligibility, 20% of the bid was due five business days after the auction closed
and the rest when the license was formally awarded).8,9
We use the FCC auction to test the theory that the highest bid submitted by a
company (not necessarily the winning bid) was affected by its own capital structure and
the capital structure of the competing firms.10  According to the theoretical models
developed, we should expect the highest submitted bid of a firm to be decreasing both
in its own debt level, as well as in the leverage of rival firms.  In addition, we examine
whether the FCC is correct in the hypothesis that the blocks have synergies.  In
particular, we investigate a specific possible synergy where the value of a block is
higher if the firm owns a block in an adjacent area (although there may be other issues,
which may determine the value of an area to a bidder, see Appendix B and see
Cramton (1997)).  If this synergy exists we would expect to see a firm increase the
highest bid it submits for an area if it owns the rights in an adjacent area.  We also use
additional control variables.
                                                
7 Each time the auction moved to a new round, the firms could submit higher bids for ANY block, not just
blocks that received a new high bid in the last round.
8 Licenses were typically awarded one to three months after the auction was concluded.
9 In a later auction of C blocks, i.e., additional competitors and a different spectrum band, the winning
bidders were only required to post a 10% down payment of the amount bid.  In that auction, bidding
reached stratospheric heights, and in 1997 several important bidders were on the verge of bankruptcy. 
The FCC had to come up with a plan, adopted with a narrow majority, to save the auction (see New York
Times September 26th, 1997 p. D1).  Auctions of later blocks (after block C) were being investigated in
1997 for collusion and fraud.  In 1998 the mess was still being sorted out.  The auctions of blocks A and B
are thus the “cleanest” auctions to work with and closest to our theoretical model.
10 Note that this multi-round FCC auction is essentially an open out cry auction, however, since sealed
bids are submitted, there are elements of a first price sealed bid auction as well.
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2.1 Data
The main source of data was the FCC web site (FCC.Gov) that lists all bids in all
auctions.  For each block for which a firm submitted a bid, we collected the final
(highest) bid submitted by the company.  Since the two blocks, A and B, were
essentially identical, we only considered the highest bid between the two blocks for
each company (some companies would quickly drop out of bidding for block A but
continue bidding for block B in the same Metropolitan area).11 
Thirty companies participated in the bidding for the various Metropolitan areas.
Some companies were limited partnerships, others were privately held.12  For other
companies we could find no additional identifying information.  We were left with 14
companies, for which a complete data set could be assembled, leading to 150
company-bid pairs.13  The number of company-bid pairs is relatively large, because we
have information about the largest and generally most active companies.14  Company
information was obtained from Compustat for the yearend 1994, which is approximately
when the auction took place.
For leverage, we used book and market value debt-equity ratios.  It is important
to note, that while the companies in our sample are indeed large and publicly traded
they fit our characterization (i.e., they have risky debt).  While one company was rated
AAA, all others were rated lower, down to BBB-.  At that level, the cumulative default
probability over 10 years is close to 3%, see Altman, Cooke, and Kishore (1998). 
The market value ratios were computed using stock prices as of December 31st
1994.  We adjusted bond prices as follows: we used the Warga Lehman Brothers’ fixed
income data base to obtain market values for all bonds available for each company. 
We adjusted the book value of the bonds for which we had information to reflect market
values.  We then adjusted the rest of the debt listed for the company by the same
average percentage.  For example, if a company has two bonds, of equal book value,
and only one bond is listed at a price of 102, we increase the price of both bonds by 2%
over the book values.  We also used interest coverage, bond ratings, and Altman’s Z
ratio as alternative measures of default risk.  For the bond ratings, we used both a
variable which transforms each rating into a numerical count, as well as, several
variations of dummy variables which divide the companies into more or less risky
subsets.  Altman's Z ratio has been used extensively to study the default risk of firms
and we used as a proxy for the risk of bankruptcy.  We also developed several
                                                
11 No firm won both block A and B in the same Metropolitan area.
12 For example, ALAACR was privately held by Craig McCaw.
13 See Appendix A for a list of all companies in the auction. The most active bidder, Wireless Co. is a
partnership of Sprint, Tele-Communications, Cox Cable and Comcast.  We formed a weighted average for
all company data based upon the weights in the partnership  (40%, 20%, 20%, 20% respectively).
14 Note, however, that our theory relates to bidding behavior and therefore is applicable to each bid by
each company rather than to total bidding behavior.
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variables to directly test our theory on the effect of the competing firms’ leverage on
bids.  We constructed two measures, a weighted average of the capital structures of all
competitors in a specific market, and an equally weighted average.  We calculated both
market value and book value measures.  We also calculated a value-weighted average
of the interest coverage of competitors.
Additional Compustat data collected included sales and total assets.  Since
bidding strategies varied by firms (see Cramton (1997)) we also included dummy
variables for some firms.
We constructed several additional variables to control for possible synergies,
which may be present in holding licenses for adjacent areas.  We created a dummy
variable which receives a value of 1 if the company in question had won a license in an
adjacent market in a previous round of the current (A and B block) auction and 0
otherwise.  Another variable measured whether or not the company had licenses in the
same area won in previous auctions.  The FCC did not allow companies that had a
strong presence (in terms of market share) in a market to bid for that same market
during this auction. Namely, no company was allowed to hold more than 45 MHz in any
Metropolitan area.  Incumbent companies held 25 MHz already, and hence were
ineligible to bid for an additional 30 MHz in the same Metropolitan area.  However, firms
with a “small” presence were not prohibited from bidding for a market.  We also
determined if companies had won earlier auctions for different wavelengths in adjacent
areas.
Bids are also strongly influenced by the population of each area and the
economic status.  Our dependent variable is thus stated as the high bid in terms of
dollars per capita.15  Population information is listed in the FCC site for each market
available.  We used additional data out of Demographics USA (1997) which listed
population and total disposable income in each metropolitan area.  This information
was used to calculate income per capita for the largest metropolitan area in each
region.
2.2 Results
Our empirical test uses the highest bid per capita, that each firm submitted for a
region as the dependent variable.16  An OLS regression is used to ascertain whether
leverage plays a role in determining the highest bid each firm is willing to submit for a
particular metropolitan region.  According to our theory, an increase in leverage should
                                                
15 This is the common way bids are described by professionals and by participants. In fact, the up front
payments and some rules were defined in terms of MHz pop which is similar to our definition.
16 This bid was not necessarily the winning bid.  If a firm did not win a market, we us the highest bid the
firm submitted in that market.
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cause a decrease in the high bid a firm submits in each region in which the firm actively
participates.  In addition, an increase in the leverage of the competition should also
decrease the high bid the firm submits.  Table 1 contains summary statistics that
describe the data.
Basic Regression With Market Leverage Ratios
In our baseline regressions, we test to determine if leverage affects bidding
behavior controlling for simple firm characteristics.  We use the market debt equity ratio
to represent leverage.  We expect a negative coefficient on this variable to reflect lower
bids with higher debt.  We also use the average debt equity ratio of the competitors in
each market as an independent variable.  If the competition lowers their bids with higher
debt, we would expect our optimal response to entail a lower bid as well.  Thus, we
expect the competitions’ debt equity ratio to have a negative coefficient.  For each
metropolitan area we include the per capita income.  We expect areas with a larger
income to be more valuable, and thus elicit higher bids.  To control for possible
synergies between owning two adjacent metropolitan areas we include a dummy
variable that equals one if the bidding firm wins an adjacent market in the current
auction.  In addition, to control for a possible interaction between the value of winning
this license and already owning a license in the same area we include a dummy
variable which equals one if the bidding firm already owns a incense in the current
metropolitan area.  We control for firm size by including either the long of firm sales, or
the log of firm assets.
Results of our baseline regressions are in Table2.  As expected, income per
capita, and the adjacent dummy both have positive and significant coefficients in all
regressions.  This implies that firms bid more for a region with a higher per capita
income, and also have higher bids in regions that are adjacent to regions in which they
have won a franchise.  Interestingly, the coefficient on the dummy variable for presence
in the area is positive, but it is not significant.  This may be due to the very small
presence allowed under FCC rules, or to the fact that different portions of the spectrum
are used for very different purposes.  The market debt to equity ratio has a negative
coefficient in all four regressions, as expected, but is insignificantly different from zero. 
The coefficient on competitors' debt to equity ratio is negative, as expected, and
significant at the 10% level.
Alternative Measures of Risk.
Two additional measures of bankruptcy risk are interest coverage and Z score. 
Interest coverage of each firm and the average interest coverage of the competing firms
in each market are determined.  A higher interest coverage implies a lower risk of
bankruptcy.  Thus, we would expect the coefficient on the interest coverage variable,
and the competitors average interest coverage to be positive.  Z score is a weighted
average of several firm characteristics.  A higher Z scores implies a lower risk of
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bankruptcy.  Thus, we would expect the coefficient on Z score and the competition’s
average Z score to be positive. 
The results of these regressions are in Table 3a.  The coefficient on own debt
equity ratio is negative and significant at the 5% level across all regressions.  This result
is consistent with the theory that as leverage increases, bids decrease.  The
competitors' debt equity ratio coefficient is also negative and significant across all
regressions as the theory predicts.  The Z score variable is insignificant.  This suggests
that while increases in debt lead to lower bids, adding Z score as a risk measure does
not help predict bid levels.  Own interest coverage is negative and significant in some
models.  This is in contrast to what we would expect since an increase in debt would
lead to a decrease in interest coverage (all else equal).  However, interest coverage
may be a weaker signal than debt equity ratio about a firms actual probability of
financial distress because operating income can very dramatically from period to period.
 If the firm experiences a period of low (or negative) operating income then interest
coverage can fall to less then 1 or even become negative.  However, if the firm has lots
of cash on hand or a large amount of assets relative to debt, the firm may not be in
danger of going bankrupt.  This would be evident by a low debt-equity ratio.  Thus, the
fact that the own firm interest coverage coefficient is negative and significant does not
necessarily mean that a firm closes to financial distress would increase their bid.  On
the contrary, we find that in the same regressions a firm with a higher debt-equity ratio
will lower their bid.  In addition, we find that the competitors interest coverage is
insignificant but that coefficient on the competitor’s debt equity ratio is negative and
significant at the 5% level in all regressions.  This suggests that as the competition
increases their debt levels a firm will decrease their bid.  This is consistent with the
theory developed.
The size variable, the natural log of assets, is positive and significant at the 10%
level in one of the models.  The coefficients on per capita income and the adjacent
dummy are again, positive and very significant.  Table 3b) is very similar, except that we
added a fixed effects dummy for Prime co. (more about this later).  This dummy is
significant, indicating that Prime indeed followed a different strategy, also, in this
regression, assets and sales are more significant.
For another proxy of firm risk we looked at each firm’s bond rating.  We defined a
dummy variable receiving the value of 1 if the bidder’s bonds are rated AA or above. 
Again we calculated the average of the competitors bond ratings as well.  A higher bond
rating implies lower risk, and thus we would expect a higher bid.  Thus, we expect the
coefficient or the bond rating variable, and the competitors bond rating to be positive. 
The variable is insignificantly different from zero in all regressions (see Table 4).
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Book Value Regressions
The next regressions (Table 6) uses book values instead of market values. The
own debt to asset ratio has the right sign and it is significant for some models. 
Competitors’ debt/equity ratios have the wrong sign but very low t values. We can
expect a less significant result for the book ratios because clearly they are less
representative of the actual state of affairs, especially in the bull market of the 90’s. 
The coefficients of the other variables are similar with similar significance levels and
similar interpretations as in the previous regression.
We have tried several other adjustments and different combinations of control
variables.  The negative sign for own debt and usually for competitors’ debt prevailed. 
In addition, we estimated a fixed effects model to control for possible firm specific
effects.  Coefficients were generally not significant, except for Prime Co., which is
included in the regressions above.  Prime Co. entered the bidding with a very specific
strategy.  It is one of the few companies that had a national vision.  According to
Cramton (1997) Prime Co. is the only company that "reduced competition" (ibid. p. 454)
because it had deep pockets.  However, because of the composition of its partners,
Prime Co. was only allowed to bid for 36% of the population in question.  The lower
competition in specific markets may account for the occasional significance of this firm
specific dummy.  When we include the other firm dummies the equations look
qualitatively similar, however, no other firm dummy is significant. 
These results are generally consistent with the hypothesis that as leverage
increases the firm’s bid decreases.  In addition, there is evidence that as the leverage
of the competition increases, the firm’s bid decreases, as the theory predicts.  We also
identify two other factors that are significant in the FCC auction.  First, income per
capita is important to the value of a metropolitan area, and thus, has an important
impact on the bid a firm submits for a region.  Second, if a firm is winning an adjacent
region this has a significant positive effect on the firm’s bid for a specific area. This
implies that there are synergies from owning rights in adjacent metropolitan regions. 
Surprisingly, prior presence does not seem to be a determining factor in bidding
behavior, but this is perhaps because different wavelengths can be used for much
different purposes, with no necessary synergies.
Probability of Winning
We next investigate if leverage is related to the probability of winning a market.
An order probit analysis is used where the dependent variable is 1 if a firm wins the
market and 0 otherwise.  The natural log of assets, market debt equity ratio, and the
adjacent dummy variable are used as independent variables.  Natural log of assets
controls for firm size, and the adjacent dummy controls for possible synergies in
winning licenses in adjacent areas.  If winning an adjacent market increases the value
of a market to the firm (and thus the highest bid they are willing to submit) we would
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expect the adjacent market dummy to be positive.  Debt to equity ratio along with a
proxy for financial distress are used as independent variables to directly test the
hypotheses that leverage affects the probability of winning.  We run three regressions
with different proxies for the probability of financial distress, interest coverage, zscore,
and a bond rating dummy.  We would expect a negative coefficient on the market debt-
equity ratio if higher debt levels lead to a lower probability of winning.  For the financial
distress proxies, we expect a higher probability of distress to lead to a lower probability
of winning.  Higher interest coverage, lower zscore, and lower bond rating all imply a
higher probability of financial distress.  Thus we would expect a negative coefficient on
interest coverage, and a positive coefficient on zscore and the bond rating dummy. 
The results are reported in Table 7.  The first column shows that Interest
coverage is not significantly related to the probability of winning.  In the next two
columns the coefficient on zscore and on the bond rating dummy are both positive and
significant.  Thus two of the three proxies for financial distress show that firms with a
higher probability of financial distress are less likely to win.  The coefficient for market
debt-equity ratio is negative and significant in one of the three regressions.  It is
insignificant in the other two regressions.  Overall the evidence is consistent with the
theory that more debt and a higher probability of financial distress result in a lower
probability of winning. 
3 Conclusion
This paper presents a theoretical model predicting how leverage should affect
bidding behavior in private value auctions. It is shown that both the degree of leverage
of the bidding firm and the debt-equity ratio of the competition are important factors in
the bid a firm is willing to submit.  In particular, as a firm increases its debt level, the
highest bid it is willing to submit decreases.  As the competition increases their debt
level, this also causes the firm to decrease its bid.
We investigate an FCC auction to determine whether the effect of debt on
bidding behavior is economically significant.  We find that as a firm’s own debt level and
as the competitions’ debt levels increase, firms tend to submit lower bids.  This
supports the theoretical model developed in this paper.  We also find that income per
capita and winning adjacent markets strongly affect the bids submitted by different
companies.
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Appendix A
The following public companies participated in the FCC auction for Block A and B:
Ameritech Wireless Communication
American Portable Telecommunication
AT&T Wireless PCS. Inc.
Bell South Personal Communication
Century Communication Corp.
Comcast Telephony Services
Continental Cablevision, Inc.
Cox Cable Communications, Inc.
GTE Macro Communications Corp.
Pacific Telesis Mobile Service
PhillieCo, L.P.
PrimeCo
Bell Atlantic
Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems
WirelessCo, L.P.
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Appendix B: Description of FCC auction.17
In the mid-90’s, the Federal Communications Commission adopted a new way of
assigning licenses for personal communication services (PCS) namely, a simultaneous
multiple round auction.  The format and the rules were developed with the help of
auction experts Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Preston McAfee.
In order to test and refine the auction design, the FCC first auctioned ten
Narrowband (50kHz) licenses, which are used to provide paging services. This auction
took place in July of 1994.  Next, 30 regional Narrowband licenses were sold.  The
former auction raised $617 million dollars and the latter, in November of 1994, raised
$395 million dollars.  However, in some sense, these two auctions were but a dress
rehearsal for the auction analyzed in this paper, which was a Broadband auction, i.e. 30
MHz licenses, for personal communication.  This auction (A and B blocks) took place
between December 1994 and March 1995 and raised 7.7 billion dollars for the
government.  It was followed by another Broadband auction that theoretically raised
10.2 Billion dollars.  However, that auction, C block, was open only too small
enterprises (annual revenues below $125 million) and featured generous payment
schedules.  Prices offered were very high and many winning bidders defaulted on the
bid payment.  Whereas the Narrowband auctions included relatively small firms, the A-
B Block Broadband auctions analyzed here elicited bids from some medium size firms
as well as the largest communication firms in the world.  Furthermore, several alliances
were formed.  The variety of firms and the fact that many of them were publicly traded,
make this auction especially suitable for this study, which requires financial information
at the firm level. 
The designers of the A-B blocks auction faced several important questions, and
in general opted for a design that was as transparent and accessible as possible, while
preventing the formation of monopolies.  First, they had to decide between a sealed bid
and an open auction.  Although sealed bids tend to discourage collusion, the advantage
of revealing more information, favored the open bid multiple round design.  For similar
reasons, a simultaneous auction, i.e. where all licenses are auctioned at the same time,
was preferred to a sequential design.  Also, the FCC decided against package bids, i.e.
when you submit one bid for several regions or areas.
Several specific rules and regulations constrained the bidders.  First, the FCC
required that no bidder ended up with too much power.  For the Narrowband spectrum,
a firm could not hold more than three licenses in any market.  For Broadband auctions,
the spectrum was limited, so that a firm could not hold more than 45MHz in each
market.  This effectively meant that an incumbent (holding a 25 MHz band) could not
                                                
17 This appendix is largely based upon Cramton (1997).
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compete in the A-B block auction, and also, that each bidder could obtain at most one
license per market.
Payments were required in three stages. First, an up front payment, which
assured eligibility.  The payment was 2 cents for each MHz x Population.  For example,
for a million people and 30 MHz, one had to pay $600,000 up front.  The winner was
expected to provide a down payment of 20% five business days after the close of the
auction, and the balance was paid 5 business days after the license had been formally
awarded.  Licenses were typically awarded one to three months after the auction.
Bidding was in discrete increments, initially set at the greater of 5% or 2 cents
per MhzPop.  There were three activity stages set by the FCC, as proposed by Paul
Milgrom and Robert Wilson.  In the initial stage each bidder had to be active (submit
bids) for at least one third of his current eligibility (in terms of MHz pop).  If activity fell
below the one-third level, eligibility was reset to three times the actual level of bidding
activity.  For example, if a bidder was eligible to bid on 180 million MHz x pop , which
would buy six 30 MHz licenses in areas with one million people each, then if valid bids
for at least two such licenses were not placed, eligibility was reduced.  If a bid for only
one license was placed, eligibility was reduced to 90 million.  In stage 2, the activity
level was raised to 2/3 of the eligibility, and to 100% in the third stage.  There were up
to 5 waivers available per bidder.  The FCC was also able to control the pace of bidding
activity through the number of rounds per day.  In the Narrowband auction there were
several rounds per day, whereas in the Broadband auction initially only one round per
day was conducted and then it was increased to two rounds as the auction progressed.
Clearly all these rules and regulations had an impact on bidding behavior, however,
proxies for differential effects on different bidders are difficult to conceptualize.
The auction ended if a single round passed with no bids in any market.  Each
bidder was fully informed about the identity, the eligibility, and the bids of all
competitors.  The Narrowband auctions ended after 47 and 105 rounds respectively. 
The auction discussed in this paper ended after 112 rounds.  Bid withdrawal was
possible, but it entailed a penalty.  Bidders in the Broadband auctions formed alliances,
even though these alliances decreased the number of markets in which each alliance
could bid. The bidders in the Broadband auction were very cautious, bids were rarely
increased by more than the minimum level.  Most firms kept activity level near the
minimum necessary to maintain eligibility.  This contrasted sharply with the Narrow
band experience.  There were 21 bid withdrawals in the broadband auctions, mostly in
round three, but only 6 qualified for a penalty.  In the end, all licenses were sold and all
monies paid, unlike the C block auction, which resulted in higher prices but many
bankruptcies and protracted legal settlements well into 1998.
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Explanation of variables:
Per capita income of market: is the income per capita of the region being bid upon. 
High bid per capita is the highest bid each firm submitted in each region per population
of that region. 
Adjacent dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm has won an adjacent region during this
auction, and takes a value of
otherwise. 
The current market dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm has a presence in the market
(as defined by the FCC) and 0
otherwise.
Natural log of sales is the natural log of the bidding firm’s sales over the 12 months
prior to the auction. 
Natural log of assets is the natural log of the bidding firm’s assets as of December 31,
1994. 
Book debt to asset ratio is the debt to asset ratio of the bidding firm in book values. 
Competitors book debt to asset ratio is a weighted average of the competing firms’ debt
to asset ratio in book values.  Market debt to equity ratio is the debt to equity ratio of the
bidding firm in market values. 
Competitors market D/E ratio is the average of the competing firms’ debt to equity ratio
in market values.
Interest coverage is the firm’s interest coverage.
Competitors interest coverage is a weighted average of the competing firms’ interest
coverage.
Z-score is a five factor multiple discriminate analysis, using weights from Altman.
Bond AA or higher dummy takes the value 1 if the firm’s bonds are rated AA or higher,
and 0 otherwise.
(Above dummy) x (market D/E ratio) is the interaction term, which is Bond AA or higher
dummy x market D/E ratio.
PrimeCo dummy takes the value of 1 if the bidding firm is PrimeCo and 0 otherwise.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables.
  
 Variable Mean S.D. Maximum Minimum
 
Per capita income of market 15.596 2.292 20.079 5.124 
High bid per capita 12.584 7.599 31.902 0.600
Adjacent dummy 0.307 0.463 1.000 0.000
Current market dummy 0.073 0.262 1.000 0.000 
Natural log of sales 9.104 1.472 11.227 6.032 
Natural log of assets 9.778 1.120 11.281 7.536
Book debt to asset ratio 0.712 0.130 1.175 0.457
Competitors book D/E ratio 0.749 0.044 0.818 0.457
Market debt to equity ratio 0.787 0.412 3.111 0.102
Competitors market D/E ratio 0.833 0.247 2.001 0.102 
Interest coverage 3.965 1.465 6.308 0.221
Competitors interest coverage 4.584 1.067 6.003 2.230
Z-score 3.816 2.884 8.796 0.305
Bond AA or higher dummy 0.320 0.468 1.000 0.000
Competitors Bond dummy 0.320 0.302 1.000 0.000
PrimeCo dummy 0.120 0.326 1.000 0,000
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Table 2: Market Value Regressions
This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the highest bid
a firm submitted in a market.  T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath each coefficient
estimate.
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Constant 2.337 2.432 2.131 2.234
(0.37) (0.39) (0.29) (0.30)
Per Capita Income 0.858 0.848 0.858 0.848
(3.34)*** (3.28)*** (3.34)*** (3.28)***
Natural Log of Sale 0.039 0.034
(0.09) (0.08)
Natural Log of Assets 0.058 0.053
(0.10) (0.09)
Market D/E ratio -1.717 -1.847 -1.725 -1.856
(-1.09) (-1.15) (-1.09) (-1.15)
Market D/E ratio of -4.404 -4.289 -4.406 -4.290
Competition (-1.78)* (-1.72)* (-1.79)* (-1.73)*
Adjacent Market Dummy 4.986 5.064 4.991 5.069
(3.77)*** (3.79)*** (3.80)*** (3.83)***
Current Market Dummy 1.273 1.273
(0.55) (0.55)
R2 0.1529 0.1547 0.1529 0.1547
Adjusted R2 0.1235 0.1192 0.1235 0.1192
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 3a: Market Value Regressions
This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the highest bid
a firm submitted in a market. T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate.
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Constant -4.423 2.982 -4.220 2.963
(-0.42) (0.38) (-0.40) (0.37)
Per Capita Income 0.829 0.834 0.833 0.833
(3.26)*** (3.28)*** (3.27)*** (3.26)***
Natural Log of Sale 1.624 1.639
(1.71)* (1.51)
Natural Log of Assets 2.361 2.244
(1.80)* (1.65)
Market D/E ratio -5.160 -4.751 -5.183 -4.759
(-2.29)** (-2.21)** (-2.29)** (-2.19)**
Market D/E ratio of -5.732 -5.587 -5.633 -5.594
Competition (-2.22)** (-2.16)** (-2.16)** (-2.14)**
Interest Coverage -1.951 -1.781 -1.780 -1.802
(-2.08)** (-2.00)** (-1.68)* (-1.57)
Competitors Interest -0.831 -0.878 -0.877 -0.874
Coverage (-1.41) (-1.49) (-1.45) (-1.44)
Z-score 0.105 -0.010
(0.35) (-0.03)
Adjacent Market Dummy 4.502 4.224 4.272 4.241
(3.43)*** (3.14)*** (2.90)*** (2.88)***
R2 0.1869 0.1851 0.1876 0.1851
Adjusted R2 0.1468 0.1449 0.1415 0.1389
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 3b: Market Value Regressions
This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the highest bid
a firm submitted in a market. T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate.
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Constant -8.572 -0.018 -8.518 -0.361
(-0.82) (-0.00) (-0.81) (0.05)
Per Capita Income 0.905 0.910 0.906 0.905
(3.59)***) (3.61)*** (3.58)*** (3.57)***
Natural Log of Sale 1.852 2.064
(1.97)* (1.91)*
Natural Log of Assets 2.706 2.681
(2.08)** (1.99)**
Market D/E ratio -5.482 -4.999 -5.485 -5.118
(-2.47)** (-2.36)** (-2.46)** (-2.39)**
Market D/E ratio of -4.961 -4.805 -4.944 -4.879
Competition (-1.94)* (-1.87)* (-1.92)* (-1.89)*
Interest Coverage -2.329 -2.124 -2.294 -2.425
(-2.49)** (-2.39)** (-2.15)** (-2.09)**
Competitors Interest -0.791 -0.845 -0.801 -0.790
Coverage (-1.37) (-1.46) (-1.34) (-1.32)
Z-score 0.021 -0.133
(0.07) (-0.40)
Adjacent Market Dummy 4.450 4.134 4.405 4.369
(3.45)*** (3.12)*** (3.04)*** (3.01)***
Prime Dummy 4.373 4.321 4.358 4.435
(2.43)** (2.40)** (2.39)** (2.43)**
R2 0.2195 0.2170 0.2195 0.2179
Adjusted R2 0.1752 0.1726 0.1694 0.1676
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 4: Market Value Regressions
This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the highest bid
a firm submitted in a market.  T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath each coefficient
estimate.
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Constant 2.259 2.380 0.981 -6.659
(0.29) (0.26) (0.12) (-0.60)
Per Capita Income 0.894 0.894 0.949 0.942
(3.38)*** (3.38)*** (3.59)*** (3.57)***
Natural Log of Sale -0.042 1.764
(-0.06) (1.71)*
Natural Log of Assets -0.051 2.538
(-0.06) (1.89)*
Market D/E ratio -1.610 -1.613 -4.768 -5.516
(-0.862) (-0.88) (-2.11)** (-2.25)**
Market D/E ratio of -4.198 -4.193 -4.754 -4.874
Competition (-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.84)* (-1.89)*
Interest Coverage -2.180 -2.468
(-2.41)** (-2.54)**
Competitors Interest -1.153 -1.071
Coverage (-1.36) (-1.27)
Bond Rating Dummy -0.181 -0.195 0.603 1.198
1 = AA or higher (-0.08) (-0.09) (0.25) (0.53)
Competitors Bond -1.180 -1.181 1.448 1.271
Rating (-0.57) (-0.57) (0.49) (0.44)
Adjacent Market Dummy 4.962 4.956 4.060 4.295
(3.75)*** (3.74)*** (3.02)*** (3.25)***
Prime Dummy 3.719 3.728 4.048 3.726
(1.55) (1.59) (1.71)* (1.62)
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R2 0.1791 0.1791 0.2188 0.2223
Adjusted R2 0.1325 0.1325 0.1626 0.1663
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 5: Interaction Regressions
This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the highest bid
a firm submitted in a market.  T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath each coefficient
estimate.
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate
Constant 6.606 5.483 2.860
(0.71) (0.69) (0.35)
Per Capita Income 0.829 0.880 0.832
(3.25)*** (3.46)*** (3.26)***
Natural Log of Sale 1.194 1.188 1.669
(1.11) (1.21) (1.50)
Market D/E ratio -6.163 -3.852 -4.747
(-2.15)** (-1.75)* (-2.20)**
Market D/E ratio of -5.449 -5.146 -5.603
Competition (-2.09)** (-2.33)** (-2.15)**
Interest Coverage -2.203 -2.102 -1.841
(-2.09)** (-2.33)** (-1.55)
Competitors Interest -0.866 -0.876 -0.868
Coverage (-1.47) (-1.50) (-1.43)
Adjacent Market Dummy 4.296 3.985 4.269
(3.18)*** (2.96)*** (2.90)***
(Market D/E)*Interest 0.974
Coverage (0.75)
(Market D/E)*Bond 4.318
Rating Dummy (1.73)*
(Market D/E)*Z Score -0.023
(-0.08)
R2 0.1883 0.2021 0.1851
Adjusted R2 0.1423 0.1568 0.1389
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) levels.
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 Table 6: Book Value Regressions
This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the highest bid
a firm submitted in a market.  T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath each coefficient
estimate.
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Constant -10.248 -10.534 -14.963 -20.317
(-0.85) (-0.84) (-1.22) (-1.50)
Per Capita Income 0.920 0.921 0.882 0.890
(3.53)*** (3.53)*** (3.44)*** (3.46)***
Natural Log of Sale 0.277 2.668
(0.54) (2.52)**
Natural Log of Assets 0.289 2.909
(0.44) (2.19)**
Book Debt to Asset ratio -5.133 -4.731 -17.676 -14.883
(-0.87) (-0.82) (-2.33)** (-2.04)**
Book Debt to Asset ratio 10.135 9.702 14.986 11.497
of Competition (0.73) (0.70) (1.09) (0.84)
Interest Coverage -2.217 -1.931
(-2.62)*** (-2.32)**
Competitors Interest -0.496 -0.401
Coverage (-0.90) (0.73)
Adjacent Market Dummy 5.037 5.077 4.308 4.755
(3.81)*** (3.84)*** (3.24)*** (3.60)***
Prime Dummy 4.014 4.032 5.119 5.050
(2.20)** (2.21)** (2.78)*** (2.72)***
R2 0.1695 0.1690 0.2101 0.2017
Adjusted R2 0.1347 0.1341 0.1653 0.1564
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 7: Determinates of Probability of Winning
This table presents the results of ordered probit regressions where the dependent variable is one if
the firm wins a market it bid upon and zero otherwise.  T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath
each coefficient estimate.
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate
Natural Log of Assets 0.353 0.657 -0.058
(-0.28) (3.77)*** (-0.42)
Market D/E ratio -0.283 -1.866 0.313
(-0.616) (-2.98)*** (1.04)
Interest Coverage -0.149
(-0.84)
Z Score 0.320
(4.56)***
Rate 3 0.737
(2.35)**
Adjacent Market Dummy 0.835 0.339 0.789
(3.39)*** (1.22) (3.19)***
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) levels.
